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The Effect of Information Gap on Earnings Management:
Management of Allowance for Bad Debts
Yoshikazu Ishinagi
It is considered that one of the purposes of earnings management is to attempt to raise the
firm’s stock price through the efficient management of accounts. We have supposed that a
manager - who is assumed to be concerned about his/her firm’s stock price - has more in-
formation on the firm’s cash flow than its investors. We then examine a transition in the
manager’s behavior that occurs as a result of the degree of information gap by using a model
in which the manager adjusts the amount of allowance for bad debts. We find that when the
degree of information gap is smaller, it is more difficult to observe the states in which the
manager increases the earnings amount through earnings management. Further, we find that
earnings management is affected by both the extent to which a manager is concerned about
his/her firm’s current stock price and the extent to which investors rely on the value of the
firm’s accounts when evaluating its price.
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Keywords: Earnings management, Information gap, Allowance for bad debts, Rational ex-
pectation
